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ON THE FAIR USE FENCE BETWEEN DERIVATIVE
WORKS AND ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING




In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress codified the doctrine of
fair use' that the lower federal courts had developed to realize the
Copyright Clause's stated purpose: "To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts." 2 The common law fair use doctrine balanced
"the level of copyright protection that would provide authors and pub-
lishers with a sufficient economic incentive to create new works, on
the one hand, while permitting sufficient freedom to those authors to
draw upon the works of others in creating new works, on the other."3
To preserve the right of authors to use some portions of copyrighted
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.S.C. and M.A.,
Ohio University, 2002. I began this Note as a paper in Professor Patricia Bellia's
excellent Copyright and the Constitution seminar and thank her and ProfessorJohn
Nagle for their guidance as I developed my ideas. Additionally, Rob Barnhart's and
Bill Patberg's insightful suggestions helped me refine my argument and for that I
thank them. Finally, I extend my grateful appreciation to the members of the Notre
Dante Law Review who provided attentive and thoughtful comments in every stage of
the production process.
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "From the infancy of copyright protection, some
opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright's very purpose,' [t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ....'"
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (citation and footnote
omitted).
3 Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use.: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody,
45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 546, 566 (1998). "Lord Ellenborough expressed the
inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to
allow others to build upon it when he wrote, 'while I shall think myself bound to
secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon
science."' Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (citing Carey v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681
(KB. 1803)).
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works in their own creations, § 107 provides the "fair use of a copy-
righted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright."4 Moreover,
§ 106 makes the copyright holder's "exclusive rights" in his or her
work subject to § 107's fair uses. 5 Among the § 106 rights limited in
this way by fair use, the Act exclusively reserves to the owner of a copy-
right the right to "prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work."
'6
Yet despite the Act's explicit exception for fair use, contemporary
copyright law takes an unfortunate dichotomous view of the rights as-
sociated with derivative works. This view frames derivative works litiga-
tion as presenting courts with only two options. In the usual lawsuit
between a plaintiff copyright holder and a defendant accused of vio-
lating that copyright, a court can either: (1) deem the allegedly in-
fringing work changes or adds enough new material to the copyright
holder's original work to create a new work that rightfully belongs to
the alleged infringer (i.e., is "transformative"), or (2) it can chastise
the defendant for trespassing too far into the plaintiffs exclusive do-
main over his or her work. I deliberately analogize to the real prop-
erty concept of trespass here because I believe courts have imported
such a physical concept into their intellectual property law jurispru-
dence. Like a fence between the plaintiff's and the defendant's land,
the line drawn by fair use between derivative works and allegedly in-
fringing ones appears to leave courts no choice but to place the case
before them squarely into either the plaintiffs or the defendant's
territory.
Instead, we should replace this "either (mine)/or (yours)" ap-
proach with one that recognizes a third choice: "neither (mine nor
yours)." This change to the physical understanding of the plaintiff's
and the defendant's rights looks like a Venn diagram where the outer
edges of all copyright holders' works overlap in the middle, creating
what we should recognize as the public domain: a commons that si-
multaneously belongs to everyone and no one.
In this Note, I argue we should interpret the Copyright Act and
Copyright Clause to see the middle ground of the public domain as a
space with content, instead of merely as a fair use fence. In Part I, I
describe how the current fence framework inappropriately influences
legal decisions, and suggest the middle ground reconceptulization will
properly frame the issues in derivative works cases. I identify two mid-
dle ground categories of intellectual property to which courts should
4 17 U.S.C. § 107.
5 Id. § 106.
6 Id.
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give space within the public domain and illustrate their function in
two leading derivative works cases. Next, in Part II, I show that by
unpacking these two decisions, we discover a subtle, perhaps uncon-
scious, accommodation of moral rights in the jurisprudence. Finally, I
discuss in Part III the appropriate steps to take in recognition of this
middle ground proposal and the moral rights influence in light of
policy concerns regarding copyright and communication in contem-
porary society.
I. THE FAIR USE FENCE
I argue courts should reconceptualize fair use, transforming it
from a mere line to an actual area: expanding the fence to become a
space with content. In so doing, I employ a metaphor involving physi-
cal notions of space to illustrate my argument. Of course, this territo-
rial approach to intellectual property is itself problematic in some
ways. Courts cannot divide artistic qualities like architectural style, lit-
erary plots, dramatic characters, lighting, and music neatly into
groups that we can identify and attribute definitely to certain catego-
ries (as we can with real property or chattels). Nevertheless, I start
here because I believe the current copyright law is mired in this kind
of physical understanding of intellectual property rights. Although
the physical approach is limited in some aspects, those limits do not
undermine the present project. The metaphor is helpful as an analyti-
cal device because it represents the way in which we commonly think
about derivative works disputes. Adopting what I believe to be the
current cognitive framework and explaining how to adjust it is the first
step towards reforming our approach. If we reconceptualize our copy-
right framework to include the third choice of a commonly-held mid-
dle ground, it becomes easier to discern which uses should be fair for
anyone (and everyone) to adopt and adapt to their own purposes.
Of course, fair uses do not comprise the entire universe of the
public domain; the idea/expression dichotomy, for example, man-
dates copyright extends only to the expression of ideas, but not to the
underlying facts or ideas themselves. 7 But while most courts preserve
real room in the commons for uncopyrightable facts and ideas,
8
7 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
8 See, e.g., id.; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879); Metcalf v. Bochco,
294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co.,
259 F.3d 25, 31-37 (1st Cir. 2001); MiTek Holdings v. Arce Eng'g Co., 89 F.3d 1548,
1556 n.19 (llth Cir. 1996); BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Publ'g, 999 F.2d 1436, 1445 (l1th Cir. 1993).
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courts often reduce the fair use portion of the commons to a mere
fence, denying space for it within the public domain.
Under the middle ground approach, the public domain should
include two categories of intellectual property relevant to derivative
works litigation: what I term a "derivative exceptions" category and a
"fringe elements" category.
A. Derivative Exceptions Category
The derivative exceptions category I propose contains the por-
tions of a work the fair use doctrine withholds from the copyright
holder's exclusive rights. This is a shifting category; elements that
constitute fair use for one allegedly infringing work may not necessa-
rily be available for use in another. This is because the fair use test
looks not just to the original copyrighted work, but also to aspects of
the allegedly infringing work.9 Thus, while the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the rap music group 2 Live Crew might fairly use some
lyrics and a distinctive bass riff from Roy Orbison's well known song
Oh, Pretty Woman in their rap song Pretty Woman because "parody, like
other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107,"10 courts
might correctly hold another work incorporating those same elements
without parodic purpose an infringement.
When courts see fair use only as a fence, they have trouble giving
content to the derivative exceptions category. The either/or choice
presented under that framework skews the decision. When faced with
a defendant's work that arguably benefited by using some of a plain-
tiff's creation, courts are too vulnerable to mischaracterizing the situa-
tion and may act on a false sense of perceived unfairness to the
plaintiff. This sense of unfairness accompanies a determination that
the defendant might profit from the portion of the plaintiffs estate
he lopped off and incorporated into his work.
But the unfairness here is based on a false underlying assump-
tion: when a court decides in favor of the defendant, it is essentially
ruling the work in question is not a derivative work. This assumption
mistakenly ignores the Copyright Act's fair use exception to an au-
thor's right to derivative works. This means some works which would
otherwise be characterized as derivative works nonetheless are permit-
ted as fair uses because they legitimately use elements that are re-
sidents of the public domain middle ground. Properly framed in this
9 For example, the Act directs courts to consider "the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes," in determining if the use was fair. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
10 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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manner, when elements from the plaintiff's original work are present
in a new work, courts can decide between more than simply character-
izing the work as either a derivative work of the plaintiffs or an en-
tirely new creation of the defendant's. The fair use middle ground
provides a third option. It lets a court recognize a fair use that incor-
porates material from the derivative exceptions category, meaning the
defendant did not steal elements from the plaintiffs domain, but
rather gathered them from the common area of the middle ground.
B. Fringe Elements Category
The second category I propose courts recognize in derivative
works litigation requires them to acknowledge the limits of derivative
works themselves. Instead of seeing fair use in otherwise derivative
works, here courts need to acknowledge that some creations which
allude to copyrighted works do not implicate the exclusive derivative
works rights of the copyright holder. The theory behind this category
is that certain fringe elements of all works belong to the public do-
main. Unlike the first category, here the elements are fixed. Anyone
should be free to use material from the fringe elements category re-
gardless of the use to which he or she puts them.
But courts may also be reluctant to give life to this group. And
when courts construe the right to create derivative works too broadly,
they force defendants that should get the benefit of using fringe ele-
ments to subject their use to a stingy fair use analysis as if they were in
the derivative exceptions category. Here again, some sense of obliga-
tion to be fair to the plaintiff influences courts considering allegedly
infringing uses that incorporate fringe elements. But this duty is mis-
placed here as well. The "one winner, one loser" approach of our
adversarial system no doubt prejudices us to view a loss for a plaintiff
copyright holder as a win for the defendant borrower. In some ways,
of course, the defendant who prevails on an infringement action
against him "wins," but that does not necessarily mean he gains some-
thing that used to belong to the plaintiff. Indeed, when the fringe
elements category is implicated, what he wins is recognition of the fact
that what he used belonged to no one: it inhabited that middle
ground of the public domain.
Thus, although the dispute before a court is framed in terms of
two adverse parties with personal interests in the outcome of the litiga-
tion, copyright disputes over fair use also implicate the interests of a
third party, the public, which has an interest in free access to public
domain elements. The fringe elements category helps a court remem-
ber the public interest involved in fair use litigation. Importantly,
20051
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then, identifying a work as using fringe elements is an intermediate
step to ruling for the defendant. Although the defendant's victory is a
necessary consequence of that decision to identify the work as using
fringe elements, finding something to be a fringe element not only
deems it fair game for the defendant to have used in that case, but
also establishes it as part of the public domain for future creators.
As such, title to the portions of the work in dispute in this hypo-
thetical case never changes hands; it remains property of the com-
mons. Under this view, when a judge draws lines to indicate where a
plaintiffs property rights end and fair use begins, she is not simply
constructing a fence that demarcates the plaintiffs property on one
side and the defendant's on the other. Instead, she marks only the
line between the plaintiffs property and one edge of the middle
ground of the public domain. Conceived of in this manner, the judge
does not shift ownership; she simply maps out what has never be-
longed exclusively to the plaintiff, the defendant, or any individual. If
this act results in a victory for anyone, it is in fact a win for everyone
equally, for all authors are entitled to use and benefit from commonly-
held fringe elements inhabiting the middle ground of the public
domain.
The derivative exceptions and the fringe elements categories de-
scribe aspects of copyrighted works which should receive protection as
fair uses. Courts can use this framework to transform the fair use
fence, giving content to the space occupied by the middle ground of
the public domain. With this approach in mind, I now turn to two
leading cases to illustrate how the middle ground method will
operate.
C. The Cat NOT in the Hat!: Borrower of Fringe Elements
Under the middle ground approach, judges should not conceive
of works that incorporate public domain fringe elements as ones that
"merely" use "'the substance or style of the original composition... to
get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something
fresh." 1 Yet that is exactly what the Ninth Circuit did a decade ago
when it ruled the book The Cat NOT in the Hat! impermissibly in-
fringed on the derivative works rights of the copyright holders. 12 The
book satirically retold the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial by evok-
11 Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir.
1997) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
12 See id.
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ing the style of the popular children's book series authored by "Dr.
Seuss." 13
The Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction issued by the
district court to enjoin the defendants from distributing The Cat NOT
in the Hat An advertisement for the book declared:
Wickedly clever author "Dr. Juice" gives the O.J. Simpson trial a very
fresh new look. From Brentwood to the Los Angeles County Court-
house to Marcia Clark and the Dream Team. The Cat Not in the Hat
tells the whole story in rhyming verse and sketches as witty as Theo-
dore [sic] Geisel's best. This is one parody that really packs a
punch!
1 4
13 "Dr. Seuss" was Theodor S. Geisel's pen name.
14 Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1397. The court quoted the following portions of The Cat
NOT in the Hat! that give a flavor of the work:
The first two pages present a view of Los Angeles, with particular emphasis
on the connection with Brentwood, given the depiction of the news camera
lights. The story begins as follows:
A happy town
Inside L.A.
Where rich folks play
The day away.
But under the moon
The 12th of June.
Two victims flail
Assault! Assail!
Somebody will go to jail!
Who will it be?
Oh my! Oh me!
The third page reads: "One Knife? / Two Knife? / Red Knife / Dead Wife."
This stanza no doubt mimics the first poem in Dr. Seuss' One Fish Two Fish
Red Fish Blue Fish: "One fish / two fish / red fish / blue fish. Black fish /
blue fish / old fish / new fish." For the next eighteen pages, Katz writes
about Simpson's trip to Chicago, the noise outside Kato Kaelin's room, the
bloody glove found by Mark Fuhrman, the Bronco chase, the booking, the
hiring of lawyers, the assignment of Judge Ito, the talk show interest, the
comment on DNA, and the selection of a jury. On the hiring of lawyers for
Simpson, Katz writes:
A plea went out to Rob Shapiro
Can you save the fallen hero?
And Marcia Clark, hooray, hooray
Was called in with a justice play.




When you're accused of a killing scheme
2005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The court enjoined the work after finding the defendants had "appro-
priated the Cat's image, copying the Cat's Hat and using the image on
the front and back covers and in the text" of the book. 5 The defend-
ants had employed an illustration styled to match the "drawing, color-
ing, and shading techniques" used in The Cat in the Hat.16 The image
portrayed a cartoon "Dr. Juice" wearing the Cat's well known red-and-
white striped stove-pipe hat.17 When the court upheld the characteri-
zation of The Cat NOT in the Hat! as a derivative work and declined to
recognize a fair use defense based on parody for the work, it commit-
ted a classic blunder based on the ill-conceived approach to derivative
works claims described above.
Seeing fair use as only a fence dividing the plaintiff's property
from the defendants', the court held the defendants infringed on the
plaintiff's exclusive rights to create derivative works based on the copy-
righted collections of Cat in the Hat and other Dr. Seuss books.' 8 One
way to view the court's decision to enjoin The Cat NOT in the Hat! is to
see a failure to give content to a fair use exception to an otherwise
derivative work; in other words, a failure to give due regard to use of
the derivative exceptions category described above. Several observers
have persuasively argued the court's decision that the work was not a
You need to build a real Dream Team.
Cochran! Cochran!
Doodle-doo
Johnnie, won't you join the crew?
Cochran! Cochran!
Deedle-dee
The Dream Team needs a victory.
Id. at 1401.
15 Id. at 1398.
16 Id. at 1399.
17 One commentator notes:
The Ninth Circuit's rationale is misleading as a factual matter, because it
implies that the character of the Cat in the Hat (the Cat's "image") was cop-
ied verbatim by the defendants. That is incorrect. The character of the Cat
in the Hat does not appear at all in the defendant's work. What appears is a
caricature of OJ. Simpson drawn in the style of Dr. Seuss, wearing the Cat's
distinctive red-and-white stove-pipe hat. It is only the hat that makes the
allusion to The Cat in the Hat recognizable. Without the hat, the defendant's
drawings would still be Seussian in general appearance, but no particular
character (and certainly not the Cat) could be identified. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit's ruling amounts to a virtual monopoly on any use of a red-and-white
stovepipe hat.
Ochoa, supra note 3, at 600 (footnote omitted).
18 Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403.
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parody entitled to fair use protection was incorrect as a matter of
law. 19
But certainly The Cat NOT in the Hat! was not a work Dr. Seuss
Enterprises wanted to produce itself. In fact, the plaintiff sought an
injunction precisely because the irreverent, satirical critique of the
Simpson trial, and events surrounding it did not match the innocent,
whimsical style of the Dr. Seuss collection. 20 It is difficult to imagine
Dr. Seuss Enterprises "deriving" The Cat NOT in the Hat! from other
Dr. Seuss works and marketing it as another work in its existing series
of children's literature. After Theodor Geisel wrote the original The
Cat in the Hat book, he (or Dr. Seuss Enterprises) created several
books that are appropriately labeled derivative works, like The Cat in
the Hat Comes Back, The Cat in the Hat Beginner Book Dictionary, The Cat
in the Hat Songbook, and The Cat's Quizzer.21 These books and other
licensed uses of the Cat character, such as "for use on clothing, in
interactive software, and in a theme park,"22 are consistent with the
whimsical, playful style and target audience of the original work: chil-
dren and their parents. In stark contrast, The Cat NOT in the Hat!
employs a 'Jaded, satirical and mocking tone" 23 and "is intended pri-
marily for adults who are either devotees of the O.J. Simpson saga or
those who desire to see either O.J. Simpson or Dr. Seuss satirized in a
creative and merciless manner,"24 making it quite dissimilar from true
derivative works.
In light of this, perhaps the court's error is greater still: The Cat
NOT in the Hat! should not be considered a derivative work in the first
place. Unlike works that truly derive from an earlier Dr. Seuss work,
The Cat NOT in the Hat! does not tell another tale situated in the Cat in
the Hat world. It does not depict characters, copy dialogue, or lift illus-
trations from the original story. As I will explore below, decisions like
this one demonstrate courts are going beyond articulated copyright
protections to allow the copyright holder to dictate glosses on the im-
19 See, e.g., Gregory K. Jung, Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, 13 BERKtLEY
TECH. L.J. 119, 127-35 (1998); Ochoa, supra note 3, at 589-620; Kathryn D. Piele,
Three Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.: What Is Fair Game for Parodists ? 18
Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 75, 91-94 (1997); Jason M. Vogel, Note, The Cat in the Hat's
Latest Bad Trick: The Ninth Circuit's Narrowing of the Parody Defense to Copyright Infringe-
ment in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 20 CARDozo L. Rnv. 287,
303-10 (1998).
20 "Seuss alleged that The Cat NOT in the Hat!... diluted the distinctive quality of
its famous marks." Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1397.
21 See id. at 1396.
22 Id.
23 Ochoa, supra note 3, at 609.
24 Id. at 608.
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age he or she has created by branding his or her creative work. Under
this view, courts are not protecting a copyright holder's right to create
derivative works based on the original. Instead, as we will see, they are
getting at a different kind of right, something akin to the European
concept of moral rights.25 Thus, the court should have viewed The Cat
NOT in the Hat! as using material from the fringe element category. In
this case, however, the Ninth Circuit failed to see a distinction be-
tween works that are truly derivative and those that merely reference
or incorporate some element(s) of an original work. Here, the single
fringe element on which the district court based its decision was the
defendant's use of the Cat's red-and-white stove-pipe hat.2 6 I will ex-
plore in the last part of this Note why courts should view a well-known
icon of popular culture like the Cat's hat as a fringe element inhabi-
tant of the public domain. Icons like this permanently inhabit the
commons and should be free for any use by anyone.
D. The Wind Done Gone: A Derivative Exception
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 27 properly frames the ten-
sion of the derivative exceptions category between derivative works
and fair use exceptions to them. The Suntrust court examined the
ability of an author to appropriate the characters, plot, and major
scenes from the book Gone with the Wind into a novel critiquing that
book's "depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era American South."28
That novel was titled The Wind Done Gone.
The defendants argued author Alice Randall's "retelling" of Gone
with the Wind in The Wind Done Gone was an "inversion" of the original
book where "the characters, places, and events lifted... are often cast
in a different light," with "strong characters from the original ... de-
picted as weak (and vice-versa)" and the romanticized "institutions
and values" of Gone with the Wind "exposed as corrupt" in the new
work. 29 Unlike The Cat NOT in the Hat, The Wind Done Gone did more
than simply reference a portion of an existing work. The Wind Done
Gone incorporated "numerous characters, settings, and plot twists"
from Gone with the Wind, and copied "often in wholesale fashion, the
descriptions and histories of these fictional characters and places...
as well as their relationships and interactions with one another."30 In-
25 See infra Part II.
26 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
27 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
28 Id. at 1259.
29 Id. at 1267.
30 Id.
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deed, The Wind Done Gone did not just tell an earlier or later story
using Gone with the Winds characters and settings; it told the same story
as the original, but from a new viewpoint: that of an illegitimate
daughter and a slave on Twelve Oaks Plantation. 3 1 As Randall's lawyer
put it:
More than just a stinging critique, "The Wind Done Gone" turns
"Gone With the Wind" upside down. At Tata, the angelic Melanie
(Mealy Mouth in Randall's version) turns out to be a murderer,
Ashley Wilkes (Dreamy Gentleman) is gay, the slaves outsmart the
slave owners, and Rhett (R) leaves Scarlett (Other) and marries her
mulatto half-sister Cynara. And Other is indeed transported to the
great white plantation in the sky.
32
Thus, unlike The Cat NOT in the Hat., The Wind Done Gone was truly a
work derived directly from the original Gone with the Wind.
As we saw above, The Cat NOT in the Hat! was quite different from
other licensed derivative works in the Dr. Seuss collection.
33 Here,
however, the copyright holder had authorized the famous movie ver-
sion of the book, as well as "the publication of Scarlett: The Sequel to
Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind by Alexandra Ripley[,] ... which
incorporated the characters, character traits, settings, plot lines, title
and other elements of the original novel," and had also contracted to
authorize, "under certain conditions, the making of a second sequel
to Gone With the Wind again using copyrighted elements of the original
novel."34 Although the Eleventh Circuit noted The Wind Done Gone
"may have little to no appeal to the fans of [ Gone with the Wind] who
comprise the logical market for its authorized derivative works,"
35 the
defendants clearly hoped to reach readers of the original work. As the
court observed, The Wind Done Gone "is principally and purposefully a
critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective,judg-
ments, and mythology of' Gone with the Wind by "explod [ing] the ro-
mantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and after
the Civil War."'36 To be effective, The Wind Done Gone needed to reach
the people who enjoyed the first novel and, through its inversion of
the story, highlight and debunk the racist and paternalistic attitudes
towards blacks depicted in Gone with the Wind. Thus, the purpose and
character of The Wind Done Gone is much more closely aligned with
31 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (N.D.
Ga. 2001), rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
32 Zick Rubin, Law: The Suit's Done Gone, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2002, at D2.
33 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
34 Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
35 Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1276.
36 Id. at 1270.
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that of the authorized derivative works than in the Dr. Seuss situation.
The Wind Done Gone was truly a derivative work of Gone with the Wind.
Because it was a derivative work, the Copyright Act exclusively re-
served the right to publish The Wind Done Gone to the copyright holder
of Gone with the Wind. Therefore, we are dealing here with the deriva-
tive exceptions category, where the fair use exception provides the
only defense to an infringement claim. Unduly influenced by the
false sense of unfairness responsible for narrow readings of fair use in
derivative works litigation, the district court issued a preliminary in-
junction against The Wind Done Gone.37 The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding the injunction improper as a prior restraint on speech.3 8 It
remanded the case, noting "under the present state of the record, it
appears that a viable fair use defense is available," 39 becoming one of
the few courts to broaden fair use beyond a fence. Even though the
court agreed The Wind Done Gone derived from Gone with the Wind be-
cause it "appropriate[d] a substantial portion of the protected ele-
ments" 40 from the novel, the court reasoned "[a] use does not
necessarily become infringing the moment it does more than simply
conjure up another work" it parodies. 4 1 In light of its value as a social
commentary and critical assessment of a copyrighted work, The Wind
Done Gone's use of substantial portions of Gone with the Wind was fair;
those portions it used are part of the shifting residents of the deriva-
tive elements category.
Of course, the use was not a particularly flattering one; indeed,
The Wind Done Gone sought to condemn the original novel's portrayal
of the South's social structure and attitudes. In so doing, The Wind
Done Gone recast classic, beloved characters in an unattractive light. As
the Eleventh Circuit noted, The Wind Done Gone "flips [ Gone with the
Wind] 's traditional race roles, portrays powerful whites as stupid or
feckless, and generally sets out to demystify [ Gone with the Wind] and
strip the romanticism from Mitchell's specific account of this period
of our history."4 2 In light of this, the plaintiff protested it had "incal-
culable millions of dollars riding on the appropriate cultivation" of
the Gone with the Wind franchise. 43 We can read into this claim the
37 Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1386.
38 Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1277.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1272.
41 Id. at 1273.
42 Id. at 1270 (footnote omitted).
43 Id. at 1276. This argument found sympathy with the district court judge. Ac-
cording to Randall's lawyer, the judge explained his decision to issue the injunction
with the statement: "I guess what really troubles me is killing off Miz Scarlett." Rubin,
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real fear behind the infringement action: that The Wind Done Gone
would negatively color the image so carefully constructed and pre-
served by the "Gone with the Wind franchise." Indeed, Randall's lawyer
explained the district court's decision to issue an injunction in terms
perfectly matched with the physical understanding of intellectual
property rights advanced at the beginning of this Note:
In the judge's view, "The Wind Done Gone" brazenly invaded the
trusts' territory-something like General Sherman's march through
the South itself-leaving in its wake a battered husk of a 65-year-old
Southern classic whose colossal earning power would be dimin-
ished. The only way to prevent the carnage, the judge concluded,
was to stop the presses. As for Randall's First Amendment right to
provide an antidote to the racism of "Gone With the Wind" -
frankly, the judge didn't give a damn.
4 4
The lawsuits over The Wind Done Gone and The Cat NOT in the Hat!
both evidence a concern on the part of the copyright holders to pro-
tect their profitable and successful brand or image. At some level,
both plaintiffs succeeded in convincing a court this interest was legiti-
mate and deserving of protection. Yet copyright law does not protect
these kinds of moral rights. This backdoor accommodation of these
kinds of interests is the subject of the next part of this Note.
II. CouRTs' BACKDOOR ACCOMMODATION OF MORAL RIGHTS
The current trend in derivative works litigation represents an ef-
fort by some courts to accommodate copyright holders' desires to pro-
tect the integrity of their famous creations. The accommodation
certainly is not explicit; in fact, it might not even be a conscious move
by the judiciary. But clearly this kind of concern motivates copyright
holders to pursue derivative works litigation to protect a profitable
image. As Professor Ochoa points out, "it is likely that Dr. Seuss was
less concerned with the minimal threat of economic competition
posed by the defendants' work, and more concerned about protecting
its 'image' as a provider of wholesome family entertainment."
45 While
Professor Ochoa analyzes this desire under various trademark and un-
fair competition claims, 46 I propose this type of claim is more properly
the province of moral rights.
supra note 32. "After all, the judge reasoned, in a bizarre exercise of literary realism,
if Scarlett is killed off in an unauthorized parody, how could she ever be brought back
to life in a red-blooded, authorized, rake-it-all-in sequel?" Id.
44 Rubin, supra note 32.
45 Ochoa, supra note 3, at 620.
46 See id. at 619-33.
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"Moral rights are personal rights that vest in the author of a crea-
tive work and exist independent of economic rights." 47 These rights
encompass principles "such as the notion that creators of works
should also be able to prevent their works from being imperfectly cop-
ied, displayed, or reformatted, and a right of attribution. ' 48 While Eu-
ropean law generally recognizes some form of moral rights, "[i] n the
United States, for better or worse, copyright law is much more explic-
itly about dollars and cents. '49 Indeed, "American courts have often
found discussions regarding an author's feelings about the use of his
or her copyrighted work outside the ambit and statutory mandate of
copyright law." 50 The concept of moral rights encompasses various
specific rights, two of which are pertinent to this discussion. These
are the rights of integrity and attribution.
A. Integrity
The author's right of integrity "is generally understood as the
right of an author to object to any distortion, mutilation, or modifica-
tion of his work that would be derogatory to his reputation or
honor."51 Although integrity usually protects a specific creation, such
as a particular piece of artwork, from unauthorized alteration or de-
struction, the idea behind it captures the desire of a U.S. copyright
holder seeking to control the type of glosses associated with his or her
work.52 Some sort of an integrity-like claim is involved when a mar-
keter of wholesome family entertainment like Dr. Seuss Enterprises
wishes to protect the integrity of that image by suppressing an adapta-
tion of one of its identifying elements to lightheartedly portray a mur-
der trial. Likewise, a desire to protect the image of the characters and
story associated with the novel Gone with the Wind causes the copyright
47 Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists
Burned Again, 17 CARtozo L. REV. 373, 373 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
48 John D. Shuff & Geoffrey T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON
L. REV. 555, 555 (2001).
49 Id.
50 Sherman, supra note 47, at 380 (footnote omitted).
51 Id. at 381 n.47.
This concept may be brought into better focus, for lawyers who might find
discussion of honor and reputation slightly ephemeral, by the analogy drawn
by Professor Damich: "Just as a United States Senator might be at great pains
to make sure his remarks are accurately reported, so the visual artist feels he
is entitled to preserve the authenticity of his visual message."
Id. (citing Edward J. Damich, A Critique of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, 14 NovA
L. REV. 407, 408 (1990)).
52 Interestingly, the language of trademark claims-"dilution" and "tarnish-
ment"-closely aligns with this notion of protection.
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holders to dislike a new work that casts that story and those characters
in a negative light.
B. Attribution
Attribution is sometimes also termed a right of "paternity" and
includes a number of sub-rights that a government may or may not
protect.53 Pertinent here, and "usually protected," is the right "to re-
move one's name from works created by another.
'54 The same desire
to carefully manage a certain image motivates a copyright holder to
fight false attributions of its image with unsavory subject matter. Dr.
Seuss Enterprises would not want its customers to think it endorsed
the content of The Cat NOT in the Hat
t, nor would the holders of the
copyright in Gone with the Wind want their loyal readers and fans to
think they approved of a version of their classic story that portrayed its
beloved characters as stupid, weak, or gay.
5 5
U.S. copyright holders seek to protect interests similar to the
moral rights of integrity and attribution. To the extent American
courts indulge these desires, they create exceptions to the fair use of
copyrighted works and expand what counts as derivative works. The
final part of this Note contemplates appropriate steps to take in light
of this situation.
III. GOING FORwARD: RECOGNIZING THE MIDDLE GROUND &
CONFRONTING MORAL RIGHTS
The reconceptualization of fair use from a fence to a space with
content I advocated at the beginning of this Note is a first step, but it
53 See Sherman, supra 47, at 381 n.48. The various sub-rights include
the fight to be known as the author of one's work; the right to prevent
others from falsely attributing to one the authorship of a work that one has
not in fact created; the right to prevent others from being named as the
author of one's work; the right to publish a work anonymously or pseudony-
mously, as well as the right to change one's mind at a later date and claim
authorship under one's own name; and the right to prevent others from
using one's work or name in such a way as to reflect adversely on one's pro-
fessional standing.
Id. (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8D.01 [A], at 8D-5 (1994)).
54 Id.
55 For example, in Gone with the Wind, "Ashley Wilkes is the initial object of Scar-
lett's affection; in [ The Wind Done Gone], he is homosexual," and the Eleventh Circuit
noted "Suntrust makes a practice of requiring authors of its licensed derivatives to
make no references to homosexuality." Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d
1257, 1270 & n.26 (11th Cir. 2001).
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is incomplete. As I noted, a territorial view is ill-suited to analyzing
intellectual property. Courts cannot measure expression like they can
weigh or count tangible property. And although I argue that fringe
elements are permanent residents of the public domain, the intellec-
tual property in the derivative exceptions category belies any attempt
to pin it down and label it. The framework I proposed is necessary to
see defects within the current approach and helps us understand how
the new method I propose alters that approach. Once we understand
the mistakes courts are currently making, we can better see how they
should proceed in the future.
Copyright scholarship and case law are replete with attempts to
divine the purpose behind the Copyright Clause.5 6 To consider this
rich debate is beyond the scope of this Note. The debate does seem
to indicate, however, that the interpretive issues related to the history
and purposes behind copyright law are so complicated they may never
be resolved. The conflicting evidence and theories leave modern-day
commentators with significant ambiguity regarding copyright's true or
original purpose. In light of this, we need to accept this uncertainty
and make decisions based on policy.
The law regarding artistic works must be grounded in an appreci-
ation for the creative process and a history of artistic development.
Creative works build off one another, contributing incrementally to
progress that in turn results in the creation of new genres of art, litera-
ture, and so on.
For as Justice Story explained, "[i]n truth, in literature, in science
and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an
abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book
in literature, scienc6 and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow,
and use much which was well known and used before."5 7
In light of this necessary borrowing, courts need to provide
enough leeway to creators to permit them to incorporate elements of
existing works into their own creations so as not to stifle this process
while still providing the proper incentive to invest time and effort into
creation by protecting existing works. Of course, this is the balance
the fair use doctrine supposedly strikes to effect the Copyright
56 For example, Lyman Ray Patterson identifies "four basic ideas as to the pur-
pose of copyright" during the early American settlement which are present in the
constitutional clause: "that copyright is to protect the author's rights; that copyright is
to promote learning; that copyright is to provide order in the book trade as a govern-
ment grant; and that copyright is to prevent harmful monopoly." LvMAN RAY PATTER-
SON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 181 (1968).
57 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Emer-
son v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436)).
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Clause's purpose. But when fair use is reduced to a mere fence, no
balance is struck at all; future creativity is sacrificed to pacify existing
copyrights.
Courts must recognize popular culture is the substance and
means of communication for the modern world. In the past, au-
thors58 alluded to the Bible, classical mythology, or other well-known
stories. While the Bible and other historical works are in the public
domain today, most modern audiences lack the requisite familiarity
with them. The result is that much contemporary incorporation of
public domain works is futile. Today, icons of popular culture per-
form the role classical tales and characters once did. Overly-proper-
tized approaches to copyright law inhibit modern creators from
implementing this important technique of allusion.
Every book, film, and song in the world draws on an existing cul-
tural commons. Creativity rarely, if ever, means inventing some-
thing out of nothing. It means taking the scraps and shards of
culture that surround us and recombining them into something
new.
When the government tells us we can't use those scraps without
permission from Disney, Fox, or the Sherwood Anderson Trust, it
constrains our creativity, our communications, and our art. It tells
us that we cannot draw on pop songs the way we once drew on folk
songs, or on TV comedy the way we once drew on vaudeville; it says
we cannot pluck pieces from Star Wars the way George Lucas
plucked pieces from foreign films and ancient legends. The conse-
quences are staggering. Imagine what would have happened if, 100
years ago, it had been possible to copyright a blues riff. Jazz, rock,
and country music simply could not have evolved if their constitu-
ent parts had been subject to the same restraints now borne by
techno and hip hop.
59
Works of satire and parody in particular depend on having an
audience possess knowledge of a particular work. For a reader to fully
appreciate and comprehend a satire or parody, he or she must be
familiar with the style, manner, form, and set of conventions of the
work being critiqued: "The satirist uses the prior knowledge of the
audience and the presumed ability of those in the audience to detect
the incongruity, contradiction, or incompatibility between what they
know of the original style or form and what they perceive before
58 Shakespeare is only the most famous of a long list of them.
59 Jesse Walker, Copy Catfight: How Intellectual Property Laws Stifle Popular Culture,
REASON, Mar. 2000, at 44, 51.
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them. '60 Moreover, "because parody depends upon audience recog-
nition of its models, the window of opportunity for the parodist is
often extremely short in duration .... [A] parody must appear while
the targeted work is still fashionable and current in the minds of the
audience."61 Thus, because "[a] udiences in the last quarter of the
twentieth century are less and less familiar with biblical and classical
literature and more or better acquainted with the artifacts of com-
merce, popular culture, and government, ' 62 a jurisprudential ap-
proach which inhibits a creator's ability to incorporate popular
culture icons into his or her work "necessarily shackles the parodist's
ability to comment upon contemporary culture. '63
Furthermore, literary criticism itself can become art when it takes
the form of parody or satire, and "[e]ven considered purely as artistic
forms . . .parody and satire are deserving of legal protection. ' 64
For whatever else it is, satire is art, however peculiar and baffling it
may be .... [And] were the disposition for satire somehow to disap-
pear from the makeup of human beings, and the variegated expres-
sions of it were to vanish, the dance of life would be diminished by
the absence of a strange and vital gesture. 65
Because often "the medium is the message," an artist who seeks to use
popular culture icons cannot reach a desired audience (and generate
the desired effect and response) through alternate means. A stuffy
journal article simply cannot drive home the same point, and will not
reach the same (or as big of an) audience, as a parodic pop song.
Finding 2 Live Crew's remake of Oh, Pretty Woman a fair use, the Su-
preme Court noted:
[W]e think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew's song reasonably could be
perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some
degree. 2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man
whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand
for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later
words can be taken as a comment on the naivet6 of the original of
an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugli-
ness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. 66
60 GEORGE A. TEST, SATIRE: SPIRIT AND ART 160 (1991).
61 Ochoa, supra note 3, at 558.
62 TEST, supra note 60, at 171.
63 Ochoa, supra note 3, at 559.
64 Id. at 561.
65 TEST, supra note 60, at 35-36; see also Ochoa, supra note 3, at 561-64 (citing
"the wide variety of authors whose parodies have enriched the world's literature and
culture").
66 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
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Despite a lack of supporting empirical data, it seems a fairly safe as-
sumption that 2 Live Crew's sales of the song in their first year, which
neared a quarter of a million copies, 67 reached a larger segment of
the American population than the Court's opinion could ever hope
to.
As we give space to a more robust public domain to accommo-
date these socially beneficial uses of popular culture, we must also
confront the current backdoor deference to moral rights in our case
law. There may indeed be a place for moral rights in our copyright
law. If this is the case, however, courts (or Congress) should recog-
nize them in a principled, well-defined, and open manner. This is
necessary for our society to preserve appropriate protection of First
Amendment values and other policy concerns, and to ensure litigants
like treatment under the law.
Copyright holders who seek to enforce their claims under a
moral rights framework must also realize a moral rights conception
does not consider economic harm as a measure of damages. Instead,
a kind of reputational capital is at stake when rights of integrity and
attribution are compromised. Therefore, a defendant might avoid lia-
bility by employing an appropriate credit or disclaimer respecting
these moral rights. Even under a moral rights system, the right of
integrity only protects the original creation. This kind of right to pre-
serve the internal integrity of a work is not the same as one which tries
to thwart external degradation of an image resulting from an original
work. Thomas Jefferson's thoughts are illustrative here: "He who re-
ceives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening
mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darken-
ing me."68 Jefferson was writing specifically about the lack of a natural
property right in inventions. Yet his conception of an idea, "which an
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself...
but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of
every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it," and which
is not diminished as it is shared, as "no one possesses the less, because
every other possesses the whole of it,"69 is as applicable to modern
copyrighted works as it was to his immediate subject of patentable in-
ventions. An author may claim a right in preserving his or her origi-
nal work, but once it becomes part of popular culture, the second-
67 See id. at 573.
68 Letter from ThomasJefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1905).
69 Id. at 333-34.
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and third-generation works it helps spawn should be beyond the pur-
view of copyright protection.
For example, one commentator, Jesse Walker, surveyed the
"astonishing array" of homemade fan epics available on the Internet.70
One, Kung Fu Kenobi's Big Adventure, is a
seven-and-a-half-minute short by one Evan Mather, with musical and
visual allusions to everything from Mission: Impossible to A Charlie
Brown Christmas. Performed by Star Wars action figures against a
computer-generated animated background this film is 50 times as




KungFu Kenobi violates more copyrights than I could count. All the
dialogue is taken directly from the soundtracks of other films. All
the characters are lifted from other films, too. And I doubt Mather
paid any licensing fees for the music. But it's an original work in
itself, a funny movie that appeals even to ogres like me who don't
care much for Star Wars.
72
Walker reprints a message from the website of the directors of an-
other homemade film, seventeen-year-old high school students from
New Jersey: "'If you have a video camera lying around, and better yet
some editing equipment (pretty cheap for computers nowadays), go
experiment. Be your own director. Go Hollywood . . . use a
skateboard for dolly shots, or a fishing rod for special effects. It's
fun."' 73 As Walker puts it:
That is, ultimately, the best argument for letting movies like this
exist. It's not just that there's a sizable subculture that wants to
watch them, and it's not just that sometimes a director like Evan
Mather will make something so fun that even nonfans will enjoy the
results. These movies are a first rung in the art of filmmaking, a
70 Walker, supra note 59, at 49.
71 Id. Walker notes:
My favorite scene: a recreation of theJedi Council meeting in Menace, on a
set made out of Legos. The Jedi knight played by Samuel Jackson rises and
delivers a speech, sampled directly from a rather different film starring Jack-
son, Pulp Fiction:
"Blessed is he who, in the name of charity and good will, shepherds the weak
through the valley of darkness, for he is truly his brother's keeper. And I will
strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger-"
Yoda interrupts: "Anger leads to hate."
Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 50.
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chance for budding actors, writers, and directors to learn the rudi-
ments of their craft. If those young auteurs want to adopt bits of the
Star Wars mythos in their films, well, why shouldn't they? Star Wars
is a part of our culture; it's a shared experience. And as [MIT me-
dia studies professor Henry] Jenkins points out, "If something be-
comes an essential part of our culture, we have a right to draw on it
and make stories about it."
7 4
Authors will be free to draw on these aspects of our shared culture to
create new works to add to our collective pop culture landscape when
we adopt the new understanding of fair use I propose: transforming it
from a fence to the middle ground between copyrighted works.
CONCLUSION
The goal of fair use is to treat both parties to a copyright dispute
fairly. When courts reduce the doctrine to a fence, they fail to give
content to the middle ground of the public domain, and thus fail to
strike a fair balance between copyright holders and those who seek to
incorporate some elements of existing works in a creative, socially
beneficial manner. Courts need to understand the false assumptions
underlying the framework within which they perceive current deriva-
tive works disputes. They should distinguish between suits that impli-
cate the derivative exceptions category and those that do not involve
derivative works at all, and thus concern the fringe elements category.
Moreover, courts need to be mindful of the influence moral rights
claims have on derivative works cases. Any accommodation of integ-
rity or attribution-like rights must be done in a conscious and care-
fully-considered manner. As courts approach future derivative works
litigation, policy concerns in light of communication realities and ar-
tistic processes in contemporary society should inform their judgment
to give proper vitality to the public domain.
74 Id.
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